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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates how the balance of power between chief executive officers (CEOs) and 
chief financial officers (CFOs) influences the use of earnings management. I employ nationwide 
awards that recognize CFO excellence as shocks to awardees’ job-market status and use a 
regression discontinuity design (RDD) to establish causal effects. I find that, compared to 
nominees who were close to winning the award, awardee CFOs experience a sharp increase in 
career opportunities, both outside and inside their own firms. Consistent with the view that shifts 
in bargaining power between the CEO and CFO can mitigate earnings management, I find that 
awardee firms have a significantly smaller magnitude of discretionary accruals than nominees in 
the first two years after the award. In addition, winning the award has a substantially negative 
effect on positive accruals, while the positive effect on negative accruals is less significant. 
Moreover, I find no evidence that the rise of CFO power triggers an increase in the use of real 
earnings management in awardee firms. Overall, my findings suggest that the balance of power 
between CEOs and CFOs plays an important role in the quality of financial reporting.  
 
JEL classification: G30, G34, J33, M41  
Keywords: discretionary accruals, CFO, CEO, balance of power, real earnings management, 
executive labor markets  
Recent news stories like General Electric’s (GE’s) potential accounting fraud and Kraft Heinz’s 
$181 million misstatement1 have attracted considerable attention from the public and academia, 
retriggering concerns about financial reporting bias and earnings manipulation. According to a 
survey of 169 chief financial officers (CFOs) in public firms by Dichev et al. (2013), 20% of firms 
manages earnings to misrepresent performance, and the magnitude of misrepresentation achieves 
10% of earnings per share in any given period. Misrepresenting performance through earnings 
management reflects a failure to accurately communicate with external stakeholders about a firm’s 
economic position (e.g., Healy and Wahlen, 1999); such activities imply, at least in part, that 
insiders extract private benefits at the expense of other stakeholders (e.g., Leuz et al., 2003). 
Therefore, it is of great practical importance to understand the underlying causes of earnings 
management. While numerous empirical studies have emphasized the effects of equity incentives 
on manipulation and misreporting (e.g., Bergstresser and Phillippon, 2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006; 
Jiang et al., 2010), explorations of the balance of power between the chief executive officer (CEO) 
and CFO are limited. In particular, we have little empirical evidence about whether the shifts in 
bargaining power from the CEO to the CFO help mitigate earnings management and improve 
financial reporting quality. 2 
I employ a quasi-experimental study on the balance of power between CEOs and CFOs and 
show that a rise in CFO power over the CEO reduces accounting-based earnings management 
(AEM) without inducing more real activities manipulation. Specifically, I employ a unique dataset 
                                                          
1 Early in 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) started an investigation into GE’s accounting 
practices, driving the firm to restate earnings for 2016 and 2017. Later that year, the SEC started another investigation 
into a suspicious $22 billion charge in GE’s earnings report. In May 2019, Kraft Heinz restated its financial reports 
for a near three-year period after investigation (see, e.g., “GE’s $22 Billion Charge Intensifies Regulatory Scrutiny,” 
Wall Street Journal, October 30, 2018; “Kraft Heinz to Restate Results for Nearly 3 Years,” CFO.Com, May 6, 2019). 
2 A small handful of works show that CEO/CFO power and earnings management are correlated (e.g., Feng et al. 2011; 
Baker et al., 2019). My paper differs in that (1) it employs events that shift the power between the CEO and CFO to 
provide direct evidence on the power-balancing effect on earnings management, and (2) the use of a regression 
discontinuity design facilitates addressing endogeneity. 
of nationwide CFO awards that influence winners’ career opportunities and use a sharp regression 
discontinuity design (RDD) to study their effects on awardee firms’ accounting-based and real 
earnings management. The dataset includes a list of ranked nominees for the “All-America 
Executive Team” Best CFO awards granted between 2009 and 2018 by Institutional Investor, a 
well-known magazine famous for providing high-quality business rankings. By comparing 
winners and losers near the award cutoff, I find that winning the award results in a notable increase 
in CFOs’ external and internal job-market opportunities. Since the CEO’s bargaining power over 
subordinates is mainly based on her influence on their promotion and retention, the increase in 
career opportunities enhances the awardee CFOs’ ability to stand up against pressure from the 
CEO. Consistent with the argument that the balance of power between the CEO and CFO benefits 
the quality of financial reporting, awardee firms, relative to non-awardees who were close to award 
status, have a significantly lower level of earnings management, as measured by discretionary 
accruals. In contrast to concerns that powerful CFOs may substitute accruals-based manipulation 
for real earnings management (REM), there is no evidence of a rise in REM in awardee firms. 
Indeed, I find weak evidence that awardee firms conduct less manipulation through abnormal cash 
flows from operations than the control group does.  
Why would the balance of power between CEOs and CFOs matter for earnings management? 
CEOs, whose compensation is largely based on equity, can greatly benefit from manipulating 
short-term stock prices (e.g., Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). Since 
CEOs do not directly participate in financial reporting, the CEO needs cooperation from the CFO. 
However, the CFO, as the responsible person in financial statements, may not always be willing 
to cooperate. Becker (1968) suggests that people commit crimes when the expected outcome is 
greater than the expected cost. On one hand, CFOs have a substantially lower portion of equity-
based compensation than their CEOs, leading to smaller equity incentives to manage earnings. On 
the other hand, CFOs bear considerable costs after being detected in manipulation, including 
potential job turnover (Hennes et al., 2008), loss of reputation, and legal punishment (Feng et al., 
2011). Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that in some cases CFOs are reluctant to commit 
earnings management. In this context, CEOs may exert pressure on CFOs to satisfy their own 
desires. 3 They can do so because they are CFOs’ direct supervisors (McAnally et al., 2008) and 
have considerable influence on CFO retention decisions (Mian, 2001; Fee and Hadlock, 2003).  
If CFOs have sufficient job-market opportunities, the bargaining power is expected to shift 
from CEOs to them. Rajan and Zingales (1998) suggest that agents exert ex ante efforts in 
specializing their human capital and gain ex post bargaining power from control over it. In the case 
of CFOs, firm-specific information and associated financial experience are critical human capital 
for the company. CFOs with sufficient external opportunities are not only less concerned about 
losing their current job, but they also gain the ability to withhold their human capital, leading to 
an increase in their bargaining power and ability to mitigate pressure from the CEO. If CEO power 
over the CFO is a cause of earnings management, one would expect the shifts of power between 
CEOs and CFOs to induce a lower level of earnings management. 
An empirical challenge in exploring the effects of the balance of power is the difficulty of 
directly observing the CFO’s job-market status and her bargaining power relative to the CEO. To 
address this issue, I use the “All-America Executive Team” Best CFO awards from 2009 to 2018 
to capture shocks to CFOs' career opportunities. Every year since 20044, Institutional Investor has 
                                                          
3 The argument is supported by both the theoretical model and evidence from the field. For instance, Friedman (2014) 
suggests that powerful CEOs are more likely to force their CFOs to implement an upward bias in financial reporting. 
Dichev et al. (2013) document that 91% of surveyed CFOs faces inside pressure to influence stock prices. Another 
survey of 141 public firm CFOs by CFO magazine shows that 17% of the respondents has been pressured to 
misrepresent accounting results by their CEOs during the past five years. 
4 I focus on 2009 to 2018 because the list of ranked nominees is not available for years before 2009. I manually search 
winners for 2004-2008 and exclude them from my test sample. 
surveyed buy-side analysts and sell-side researchers in the financial sector and requested 
nominations for the best executives, including the best CFOs, in each business sector the magazine 
defines. The ranking of a candidate is determined by the number of votes she receives relative to 
other nominees in the same sector. In general, the top-three ranked candidates in each sector are 
granted the award.5 Though firms may have some influence on nominations, it is difficult to 
precisely manipulate ranks immediately around the award cutoff. Moreover, only the names of 
awardees are publicly available, not non-awardee nominees. Therefore, the ranking allows for the 
use of a sharp RDD that compares firms just above and just below the award cutoff to explore how 
a rise in CFO power over the CEO affects earnings management.  
I first validate whether winning the award affects awardees’ job-market status. I manually 
track the promotion history for all awardees and the top-10 ranked non-awardees within a time 
interval from the first year after the award to 2019. I compare the ex post career opportunities 
between the lowest-ranked awardees and the highest-ranked non-awardees, as well as between all 
awardees and all top-10 ranked non-awardees. Consistent with previous findings on award effects 
on CEO and director job-market status (Malmendier and Tate, 2009; Chen et al. 2019), I document 
that awardee CFOs are more likely to experience an external promotion and, in particular, more 
likely to gain a key position6 in another firm. Inside the current firm, awardees have a significantly 
higher chance to experience internal promotion, including to a key position.7 These results suggest 
that not only does the external labor market provide better opportunities to awardees, but current 
employers also attempt to retain these star CFOs by enhancing their chance of internal promotion. 
                                                          
5 In 2009, only the highest ranked nominees in each sector received the award. Moreover, to receive the award, 
candidates must meet the criterion of minimum votes. If the minimum votes criterion is not achieved, a candidate 
will not receive the award even if he or she is top ranked.  
6 A key position in a firm is defined as the chief executive office, president, and/or chief operating officer (COO). 
7 Details about the definition of external and internal promotion are described in Section 4. 
Given that the main power that CEOs have over the CFO is to influence her career opportunities 
(Matejka, 2007), awardees who become less concerned about losing current job have an increased 
ability to withhold their human capital and thus gain more bargaining power with their CEOs. 
Next, I examine the consequent effects of the shifts in power between CEOs and CFOs on 
earnings management. Following prior studies (e.g., Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Jiang et al., 
2010; Chava and Purnanaham, 2010), I use the absolute value of discretionary accruals as a proxy 
for the magnitude of accounting-based earnings management. Consistent with the view that the 
balance of power between CEOs and CFOs can reduce earnings management activities, I find that 
the level of discretionary accruals in the lowest-ranked awardee firms is, on average, 106 basis 
points less than the highest-ranked non-awardee firms in the two-year period following the award. 
Given that the average magnitude of discretionary accruals is 0.04 in my sample, the economic 
significance of this decrease is prominent. Because the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
cannot completely capture the changes in accruals management (e.g., changes in the sign), I also 
include signed discretionary accruals in my main tests and divide the sample into positive and 
negative accruals. Consistent with Friedman’s (2014) theoretical model in which powerful CEOs 
are more likely to push earnings upward, I find that winning the award has a significant and 
negative effect on positive accruals but a weaker effect on negative accruals. Though prior work 
suggests that the equity incentives of CEOs and CFOs are associated with earnings management, 
my results are still significant, both statistically and economically, after controlling for CEO and 
CFO pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS).  
One possibility is that awardee firms become less involved in earnings management for 
reasons other than the balance of power between CEOs and CFOs.8 To address this concern, I 
                                                          
8 One alternative explanation, for example, is that winning an award brings substantial visibility to awardee firms, 
making the market expect high quality in their financial reporting and thus creating more external pressure. 
conduct a subsample comparison between firms with different levels of CEO bargaining power. I 
generate two subsamples using a CEO power indicator constructed in the spirit of previous 
literature (e.g., Adams et al., 2005). If a decrease in the CEO’s relative power is the main channel 
of the reduction in discretionary accruals, one would expect a difference between the two 
subsamples. This is because when a firm has a less powerful CEO, winning the award may have a 
limited marginal effect on earnings management as the CEO already has weak influence over the 
CFO. Consistent with this prediction, I find that the award effects are significant only when CFOs 
face powerful CEOs. In the subsample of powerful CEOs, winning the award reduces the 
magnitude of the two-year average discretionary accruals by 0.017, significant at the 1% level. In 
contrast, the award effect is smaller and statistically insignificant in the regular CEO group. 
Similarly, I find a significant and negative effect of the award on positive accruals in the powerful 
CEO group, while the effect in the regular CEO group is insignificant.  
Another concern is that awardee CFOs may still conduct manipulation to achieve earnings 
targets, but tend to adopt REM as a substitute for accounting-based methods because the former 
has a relatively lower risk to be detected by external monitoring (e.g., auditors). Previous studies 
have documented the use of REM in recent years (e.g., Graham et al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006) 
and find evidence that firms make choices between AEM and REM (e.g., Cohen et al., 2008; 
Badertscher 2011; Zang, 2012). Baker et al. (2019) suggest that firms use more REM when the 
CFO is powerful relative to the CEO. However, I find that awardee firms where CFOs have gained 
more bargaining power over the CEO do not show an increase in the use of REM, as measured by 
abnormal cash flows from operations, discretionary expenditures, and production costs. Indeed, I 
find weak evidence that the lowest-ranked awardees conduct less earnings management through 
abnormal cash flows from operations than the highest-ranked non-awardees. Overall, there is no 
evidence that the shifts of power from CEOs to CFOs lead to altering earnings management 
techniques rather than improving the quality of financial reporting. 
 My study contributes to the literature in several respects. Using a quasi-experiment, my work 
is among the first to show direct and clean evidence that the balance of power between CEOs and 
CFOs helps improve financial reporting quality. Prior empirical studies have used variables like 
CEO/CFO board status and relative pay share to measure their power and provide valuable insights 
about the relation between these power proxies and earnings management. For instance, Feng et 
al. (2011) document that firms with significant financial manipulations have similar CFO equity 
incentives but more powerful CEOs than their matched counterparts. Baker et al. (2019) show that 
AEM (REM) is associated with CEO (CFO) power over the CFO (CEO). A challenge in 
interpreting these results, however, comes from potential endogeneity. For example, the use of 
financial manipulation may be harmful to the CFO’s individual performance and reputation, 
leading to an increase in the relative power of the CEO; the intensive use of REM, which is 
negatively associated with future firm performance, may hurt the CEO’s performance, driving up 
the relative power of the CFO. My study employs award events that impair CEO power through 
improving CFO job-market status and uses RDD to establish the causal effect, thus providing 
direct and precise evidence of the effect of CEO-CFO power shifts on earnings management.  
Second, this work sheds light on the channel through which CEOs can manipulate earnings 
and suggests a possible solution to the problem. The existing literature documents a significant 
relation between CEO equity incentives and earnings management (e.g., Cheng and Warfield, 
2005; Bergstresser and Phillippon, 2006). However, it is not clear how CEOs respond to such 
incentives and initiate manipulation. My results suggest that the influence of the CEO on 
subordinates’ career opportunities may force CFOs to manipulate earnings in response to CEOs’ 
desires. More importantly, the results show the effect of improving CFO career opportunities in 
offsetting CEO bargaining power and reducing manipulation. These findings have important 
implications for current corporate governance reform; that is, firms may benefit from increasing 
CFO independence, adding positions (e.g., chief audit officer) that can provide support for the 
CFO’s independence, and balancing the CEO’s power in subordinates’ hiring, compensation, and 
turnover decisions. 
The findings of my study also complement the sizable body of literature that explores 
manipulation through real activities and firms’ choices between REM and AEM (e.g., 
Roychoudhury 2006; Graham et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2008; Badertscher, 2011; Zang, 2012). 
Instead of limiting my research to only one type of earnings management technique, my 
examination includes both AEM and REM and, thus, provides a complete picture of the 
consequences of improving CFO relative power. Despite previous findings that powerful CFOs 
may prefer REM (e.g., Baker et al., 2019), I find no support for that an increase in CFO power 
over the CEO causes a substitute of AEM for REM. This mitigates the concern about whether the 
decrease in AEM will be offset by a more intensive use of REM. Indeed, my findings suggest that 
the balance of power between CEOs and CFOs improves the overall quality of financial reporting 
because it reduces the level of accounting-based earnings management without incurring a jump 
in manipulation through real activities. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 develops hypotheses for 
empirical tests. Section 2 provides details on the award data, the RDD strategy, and key-variable 
construction. Section 3 presents empirical results. Section 4 concludes.  
1. Hypotheses Development 
I start by analyzing the impacts of winning the award on awardees’ career opportunities. As 
Frey and Neckermann (2010) show, awards in recognition of excellence function as signals of 
unobservable individual dedication and ability. As long as the award results are not perfectly 
predictable, the award conveys new information to the market about an awardee’s individual 
characteristics, such as effort and talent. Given the existence of an active external labor market, 
awardees are viewed as highly favored job candidates. In other words, if an award represents a 
substantial shock to reputation capital, it brings more outside career opportunities to awardees. To 
examine this proposition, I use a regression discontinuity design (RDD) first proposed by 
Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) to estimate the local average treatment effect around the 
award cutoff. Given that it is hard to manipulate ranks around the cutoff, CFOs whose ranks are 
just above or just below the cutoff can be assumed as close-to-randomly assigned to a treatment. 
Then I compare the ex post career opportunities between the lowest-ranked awardees and the 
highest-ranked non-awardees. The analysis and empirical strategy lead to the following hypothesis:  
H1: The lowest-ranked awardees have more outside job opportunities than the highest-ranked 
non-awardees. 
Despite an increase in potential outside offers, an awardee does not have to join another firm 
as long as her promotion opportunity in the current company increases to an equivalent level. 
Awardees’ current employers may be willing to provide the reward because the specialized human 
capital of these job-market stars are in precious and its withdrawal could lead to a decrease in 
economic rent. Accordingly, an awardee who is retained in the current company is expected to 
experience a significant increase in internal promotion and total compensation caused by the 
increase in external job opportunities. 
H2: The lowest-ranked awardees have a higher likelihood of being promoted inside the firm 
than the highest-ranked non-awardees. 
Next, I develop hypotheses about how the change in awardee CFOs’ job-market status 
influences the use of earnings management in their firms. According to Rajan and Zingales’ (1998) 
framework, employees gain bargaining power over employers through the ability to withhold their 
human capital inputs. Though the CEO has critical influence over the CFO’s compensation and 
retention (Matejka, 2007), top CFO awardees who experience a notable increase in external job 
opportunities might gain bargaining power from their improved ability to withdraw their 
specialized human capital (e.g., experience and knowledge associated with firm-specific 
information) from the current firm. In other words, awardees who become less concerned about 
losing their current jobs have increased bargaining power relative to their CEOs. If CEO power is 
a cause of earnings management, one would expect to observe a lower level of earnings 
management in awardees’ firms since awardees have gained more bargaining power relative to 
their CEOs. In the spirit of previous literature, I use the magnitude of discretionary accruals to 
measure the level of earnings management. I expect the lowest-ranked awardee firms to have less 
discretionary accruals than the highest-ranked non-awardees. I formalize this hypothesis as follows:  
H3: The magnitude of discretionary accruals decreases in firms of the lowest-ranked 
awardees, as compared to the highest-ranked non-awardees. 
Moreover, if the shift in power between CEOs and CFOs is the channel for the decrease in 
earnings management, the award effect should differ among firms with different levels of CEO 
bargaining power. For firms with powerful CEOs, the award effect is expected to be significant 
because the decrease in CEO power reduces the CEO’s influence over the CFO to fiddle with 
earnings. In contrast, winning the award may not significantly affect firms with less powerful 
CEOs because these CEOs already have weak influence over their CFOs and the marginal effect 
of further reducing their power is limited. This discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
H4: The effects of winning an award on the use of discretionary accruals are stronger for 
firms with powerful CEOs.  
In the case of REM activities, however, the effect of winning an award is not clear. While 
AEM deals with accounting standards and principles, REM is achieved by real activities and 
appears as “departures from normal operational practices” with a motivation to reach a certain 
reporting goals (Roychowdhury, 2006). Though CFOs might be reluctant to conduct AEM due to 
their responsibility as a monitor of financial reporting, their concerns about the use of REM is 
much less since it is less likely to be detected by the scrutiny of auditors (Gunny, 2010). 
Furthermore, Zang (2012) find that firms conduct more REM when the costs of ARM increase. 
Awardees may prefer REM if winning the award causes more external pressure due to an increase 
in visibility. On the other hand, CEOs may not prefer REM because it has negative influences on 
future performance (Zang, 2012).  Therefore, an awardee CFO, who gains more power over the 
CEO, may choose to (and is also able to) substitute AEM for REM to meet earnings targets. This 
argument is consistent with previous findings that firms with powerful CFOs have a greater level 
of REM (Baker, et al. 2019) and can be expressed as the following hypothesis: 
H5A: Awardee firms conduct more REM than their non-awardees counterparts. 
An alternative prediction is that awardee CFOs tend not to increase REM while reducing AEM. 
After all, the use of REM is motivated by the desire to achieve earnings targets even if doing so 
may mislead other stakeholders and thus violates one of a CFO’s primary responsibilities, that is, 
to accurately communicate with other stakeholders through information provided in financial 
reports. Awardees, like other CFOs, have smaller equity incentives than the CEO. Moreover, they 
face less pressure from the CEO to meet earnings goals after the award. Therefore, they might not 
consider it necessary to use REM as a substitute when AEM declines. If so, the balance of power 
between CFOs and CEOs can be considered beneficial to financial reporting quality, because it 
reduces AEM without causing a more intensive use of REM as a substitute. I formulate the 
following competing hypothesis of H5A: 
H5B: Awardee firms have no significant increase in REM, compared to non-awardee firms. 
2. Award Data, RDD, and Outcome-Variable Construction 
2.1 The “All-America Executive Team” Best CFO Award 
The core of my data is a list of ranked nominees for the “All-America Executive Team” Best 
CFO award granted by Institutional Investor magazine between 2009 and 2018.9 I choose this 
award because (1) it is national in scope and open to any CFO in the United States, (2) it is granted 
by a prestigious organization and thus can affect the awardee’s subsequent status in the labor 
market, and (3) the award process is credible and reliable so it is unlikely that the ranks around the 
award cutoff can be manipulated. More details are provided below.   
With a circulation of more than 100,000, Institutional Investor is a leading magazine that 
mainly serves institutional investors (e.g., pension funds, mutual funds, money managers); it is 
well known for providing global research and rankings often considered industry benchmarks. 
Every year since 2004, a research team from the magazine sends surveys to investment 
professionals in both the buy-side and the sell-side, requesting them to nominate the best CFOs 
across more than 40 business sectors. 10  The award aims to identify “the work of the most 
                                                          
9 Before 2010, the award was named “America’s Best CFOs.” Since 2010, Institutional Investor has terminated the 
old award category and published the list of the “All-America Executive Team,” which separately recognizes the best 
CEOs, CFOs, investor-relation (IR) professionals, IR programs, and analysts.  
10 The sector is identified by Institutional Investor. The yearly number of sectors is from 44 to 58. The variation is 
mainly because in some years, Institutional Investor divides large sectors into several smaller groups (e.g., Banking, 
large-cap; Banking, mid-cap and small-cap).  
noteworthy financial executives” 11  and is considered a great honor by many firms and 
individuals.12 Though the organizer does not provide formal criteria for the selection process, it 
highlights that survey respondents vote for CFOs who effectively communicate with other 
stakeholders about firm performance and contribute to improving operations and revenues. 
Award recipients are determined in a reliable voting process using secure, web-based ballots, 
with follow-up phone calls for more details when necessary. The number of responses has ranged 
from 2,000 to more than 3,000 in recent years.13 Survey respondents are asked to nominate up to 
four best CFOs across all sectors in their coverage universes without a preset list of candidates. 
Identities are kept confidential to assure fairness. After receiving feedback, the organizer’s own 
research group ranks nominees within each sector based on the number of votes they received. In 
most years during my sample period, the top-three ranked nominees become awardees, under the 
condition that the minimum votes criteria are achieved. In 2009, only the highest-ranked nominees 
were granted the award. Only the names of awardees are announced to the public, while nominees’ 
identities are kept private. 
Every year except for 2009, Institutional Investor has separately announced two lists, both 
online and in print: the buy-side best CFOs and the sell-side best CFOs.14 Because of possible 
biases from the sell-side, I use the buy-side list of ranked nominees and exclude sell-side awardees 
from my sample in robustness tests. Overall, 7,223 CFOs are nominated by buy-side professionals 
across more than 40 sectors between 2009 and 2018, including 2,843 unique individuals and 2,187 
unique firms. A total number of 2,163 unique firms in the list are successfully matched to the 
                                                          
11 “The Best CFOs in America”, Institutional Investor, 2004, 
http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/1026650/the-best-cfos-in-america.html#.WOAgZFUrJtQ 
12 Awardee CFOs and their firms usually include the award news in their profiles or newsletters as proof of 
excellence; see, for example, https://www.westernalliancebancorporation.com/news/WAL-Institutional-Investor-
2018-all-america-executive-team 
13 A total of 3,022 buy-side analysts and portfolio managers at 1,073 firms voted in 2018, according to the magazine. 
14 There was no sell-side voting in 2009.  
CRSP/Compustat merged database. I exclude all unmatched nominees from my sample because I 
rely on CRSP/Compustat to construct earnings management measures. Figure 1 shows the number 
of awardees, non-awardees, and all nominees by year. 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
The year 2009 has the lowest number of awardees because only the highest-ranked nominees 
received the award in that year. The relatively small awardee number from 2010 to 2012 is because 
some awardees failed to achieve the minimum votes caused by a low response rate. To address the 
problem that the top-three nominees do not necessarily become awardees, I follow Howell (2017) 
to center ranks on zero. Specifically, the lowest-ranked awardees are re-ranked as 1, and the 
highest-ranked non-awardees are re-ranked as -1. Each sector-year has at least one [-1, 1] pair. 
Then I expand the band range to include higher-ranked awardees and lower-ranked non-
awardees.15 Unless otherwise specified, all ranks I use in the paper are centered ranks. 
Figure 2 shows the number of nominees whose centered rank is in the range of [-1, 3]. Panel 
A includes CFOs who are successfully matched to the CRSP/Compustat merged database.  As 
explained earlier, no awardee has a centered rank higher than 1 in 2009, and the number of higher 
ranked awardees in 2010-2012 is relatively small. After 2012, the difference among the four 
groups becomes narrower. To assure that treatment does not affect ranks, I exclude all previous 
awardees, including winners from 2004 to 2008, from my primary tests.  
[Insert Figure 2] 
Panel B of Figure 2 reports the number of CFOs after excluding previous winners for the top-
four groups. Since winning the award can significantly improve an awardee’s visibility and status, 
it is not surprising that many previous awardees regain a high rank in a later competition, leading 
                                                          
15 For instance, rank = 2 is assigned to awardees who are ranked one spot higher than rank = 1, if any, while non-
awardees who are ranked one spot lower than rank = -1 have a centered rank = -2.  
to a significant decrease in the number of current awardees after excluding previous winners from 
the sample. The number of CFO-year observations decreases to 4,682. This influence is more 
significant for the top-two ranked groups (i.e., centered rank = 2 or 3) but less substantial in the 
two groups immediately around the cutoff, leaving a fairly large number of observations  in these 
two groups (143 and 276, respectively) to allow a comparison between them. 
2.2 Empirical Strategy 
To identify a causal relation between the rise of CFOs’ relative power and earnings 
management, I use a sharp RDD, in which a treatment (win the award) occurs when the ranking 
of a nominee reaches a threshold (centered rank = 1 or higher). Because CFOs just above and 
below the threshold can be considered close-to-randomly assigned to a treatment, one can establish 
the causal effect of the treatment by comparing the average differences between the two groups. 
Following Howell (2017), I employ two different samples in the main tests: the narrow sample 
which only includes nominees whose rank ranges in [-1, 1] and the complete sample which 
includes all awardees and non-awardees. 16  The narrow sample compares awardees and non-
awardees with only a one-rank difference. For this sample, I estimate the following regression: 
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽2 × 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜂𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  ,   (1) 
where 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is a given outcome after the award; 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑒 indicates rank = 1; 𝑋𝑖,𝑡are controls; 
𝜂𝑡is the award year dummy; and 𝜂𝑠 is the sector dummy.  
To extend the sample size, I also pool the nominee data and include a quadratic function of 
ranks as in Howell (2017). I employ the following model for the complete sample: 
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽2 × 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 + 𝛽3 × 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘
2 + 𝛽4 × 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜂𝑠
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,   (2) 
                                                          
16 When examining ex-post promotions, only the top-10 ranked non-awardees (i.e., rank ∈ [-10,-1]) are included. 
where 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑒 indicates rank ≥ 1; 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 is the translated rank calculated by adding the 
absolute value of the minimum rank to each centered rank; and 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘2is the squared term. I 
use logistics regressions to examine the external and internal promotion because the dependent 
variable is an indicator for a given type of promotion. I employ ordinary least squares (OLS) in 
other estimations. I cluster standard errors by sector-year in all specifications. 
My RDD is valid for several reasons. First, the award is granted by a famous organization and 
is used to recognize CFO excellence. Only the list of awardees is publicly available, not the list of 
non-awardees. Hence, winning the award can be considered a positive shock to a winner’s labor 
market status, satisfying the requirement that treatment should be allowed to affect the outcome. 
Second, the award decision occurs after ranking, not the other way around. I also exclude from my 
sample previous winners whose reputation as an awardee could influence the number of future 
votes. Therefore, ranks in my sample are not caused by the treatment. Last but not least, ranks 
around the award cutoff cannot readily be manipulated in my setting. Because the number of votes 
received relative to competitors directly decides one’s ranking, and votes are submitted by 
thousands of investment professionals, this excludes the likelihood that the organizer can 
determine the results. It is also difficult for candidates to manipulate the results because (1) firms 
do not know who receives the survey and who responds to it, (2) they have no information on their 
competitors or their own standing, and (3) an increase in one’s actual number of votes does not 
assure an improvement in her relative ranking because each survey recipient is allowed to nominate 
up to four candidates; in other words, nominating one candidate does not exclude the chance of 
another candidate being nominated. 
Figure 3 demonstrates continuity in baseline firm/individual attributes in the award year.17 
Changes around the cutoff are smooth in most cases. I also show smoothness in outcome variables 
in the award year in section 4. In addition, I conduct a set of balance tests on the narrow sample. 
No significant difference is found between the treatment and control samples. The largest absolute 
value of the t-statistic (see Table A1 in the appendix) is 1.4. 
[Insert Figure 3] 
2.3 Construct Outcome Variables 
To measure the job-market status of CFOs in the award list, I manually track the promotion 
history for all awardees and the top-10 ranked non-awardees from the first year after the award to 
2019. Data sources include Execucomp, Bloomberg Executive Profile and Biography database, 
proxy statements, company websites, business news archives, and Google.  I group all promotions 
into two categories: external and internal. External promotion is defined as the first time that a 
CFO experiences one of the following outcomes after receiving the award or attaining a 
nomination: (1) gains a key position, including CEO, president, or COO, in another firm, (2) 
becomes the CFO of a larger firm18, or (3) other external job change which can be considered a 
promotion (e.g., a CFO becomes a senior vice president and CFO in another firm). I define internal 
promotion as, after the award, the CFO is promoted to a key position in her own firm or to 
executive director, or the CFO experiences another internal position change that can be considered 
a promotion (e.g., a CFO becomes a vice chair, or a vice president and CFO becomes an executive 
vice president and CFO). 
                                                          
17 The award year is defined as the fiscal year that ends preceding the announcement of the awardee list. 
18 I consider large in size to be a proxy for firm prestige in the spirit of recent work by Masulis and Mobbs (2014). A 
larger firm is defined as a firm that holds more total assets than the CFO’s existing firm as of the fiscal year-end 
when the CFO moves. 
I rely on Compustat to construct measures for accounting-based and real earnings 
management. I use the modified Jones model proposed by Dechow et al. (1995) to estimate 
discretionary accruals.19 Specifically, I estimate a regression cross-sectionally in each year and 
SIC two-digit industry group with at least eight observations: 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1 × (1/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2 × (∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡  ) + 𝛽3 × 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  ,   (3) 
where 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is total accruals, defined as earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations minus cash flows from operations. 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1is the lagged total assets. ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the 
change in sales for firm i in year t. ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is the change in net receivables in year t. 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the 
gross property and equipment. 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡, ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡, ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡, and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 are all scaled by 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1. The 
predicted value from the regression is defined as normal accruals. Discretionary accruals is then 
calculated as the difference between the total accruals and the estimated normal accruals. In main 
tests, I track the changes of discretionary accruals from the award year (t0) to two years after (t2).  
Following previous literature (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008), I measure real 
earnings management using abnormal cash flows from operations, discretionary expenses, and 
production costs. Specifically, I estimate the following three regressions for the normal level of 
cash flows from operations, discretionary expenses, and production costs: 
𝐶𝐹_𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1 × (1/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1) +  𝛽2 × 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3 × ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  ,   (4) 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1 × (1/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1) +  𝛽2 × 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  ,   (5) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1 × (1/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2 × 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3 × ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3 × ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  ,   (6) 
In the above three models, CF_Oi,t is the actual level of cash flows from operations. 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is 
the sum of R&D, advertising, and selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses.20 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 
                                                          
19 I also use the performance-adjusted model as suggested by Kothari et al. (2005) in robustness tests and obtain 
similar main results. 
20 Missing R&D and advertising expenses are set to zero as long as SG&A is available. 
is the sum of costs of goods sold and change in inventory. 𝐶𝐹_𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ,𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑡, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡, 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡, 
∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡and ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 are all scaled by 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1.  
I estimate the above cross-sectional regressions by each year-industry with at least eight 
observations. The abnormal level of cash flows from operations and discretionary accruals are 
denoted as RM_CFO and RM_DISX and are calculated as the estimated residuals from models (4) 
and (5), respectively. I multiply RM_CFO and RM_DISX by -1 so that higher values indicate larger 
level of real earnings management. The estimated residual from model (6) is the abnormal level of 
production costs, denoted as RM_PROD.  
Table 1 reports summary statistics for various outcome variables and key controls, split into 
lowest-ranked awardees, highest-ranked non-awardees, and all nominees. Panel A shows that, 
during the years after an award, the lowest-ranked awardees have a noticeably higher chance to 
experience external/internal promotion or both. The mean percentage of lowest-ranked awardees 
who experience at least one type of promotion after the award is 35%, in contrast to 26% of the 
highest-ranked non-awardees and 22% of all nominees whose centered rank is higher than -10.   
[Insert Table 1] 
Panel B focuses on proxies of AEM and REM and reports their levels at t0 and t2, as well as 
the (t1, t2) average. While there is no obvious difference in the average level of discretionary 
accruals in the award year among the three groups, the difference for the post-award period is 
remarkable. The average magnitude of discretionary accruals decreases from 0.04 to 0.02 within 
two years after the award for the lowest-ranked awardees, but stays as 0.04 for the highest-ranked 
non-awardees. However, no clear trend is captured for REM. On one hand, the rank = 1 group has 
a decrease in RM_CFO and RM_PROD, indicating a decrease in real earnings management. On the 
other hand, this group also has more RM_DISX, implying an increase in real earnings management. 
Panel C demonstrates key controls in the award year for the three groups. Data sources for control 
variables include CRSP, ExecuComp, BoardEx, and Audit Analytics. I also manually collect 
missing data of CFO age and tenure from Bloomberg, proxy statements, 10-k files, and Google. It 
is clear from Panel C that while firms and individuals around the cutoff (rank = 1 and rank = - 1) 
are visibly different from the rest of the sample along many dimensions, the difference between 
them is not as apparent, consistent with the continuity in baseline firm/individual attributes around 
the cutoff, as shown in Figure 3. 
3. Main results 
3.1 Award Effects on CFO Career Opportunities 
In this section, I examine whether the CFO awards have significant effects on awardees’ career 
opportunities outside and inside the firm. I first visually demonstrate the external and internal 
promotion ever after the award for awardees whose rank = 1 or 2 and non-awardees whose rank ≥ 
-6. I do not include the highest-ranked awardees in this figure and thereafter because of the 
considerably small number of observations and large variance in this group, as shown in Figure 2.  
Figure 4 reveals that awardees experience more internal promotion after the award than non-
awardees. With regard to external promotion, however, the difference between awardees and non-
awardees is not as obvious. Meanwhile, all panels in Figure 4 demonstrate a concave shape for 
nominees whose rank >= -2. This is not surprising since rank is highly related to one’s ability and 
status, and thus the best CFOs may have already gained very good job positions, leaving little 
room to a further improvement. 
[Insert Figure 4 Here] 
Next, I turn to regression analysis to conduct a more careful examination. I estimate equation 
(1) and (2) and use logistic regression in all specifications. Results are reported in Table 2. In Panel 
A, I focus on external promotion and employ a subsample of CFOs who leave the company at 
some point after the award. Column 1 and 2 study the likelihood of gaining a key position in 
another firm, while column 3 and 4 include any of the 3 types of external promotion, as defined in 
section 2. In line with H1, coefficients on the awardee indicator are significant and positive for 
key position in both the narrow group (rank ∈ [-1, 1]) and the complete group (all nominees). When 
it comes to external promotion, however, the coefficient is significant only in the narrow group 
but not in the complete group. This may be because many awardees, in particular the top-two 
ranked ones, are already in the most prestigious firms and thus have relatively small motivation to 
join another firm in action. However, this does not imply that awardees face less potential outside 
offers and job-market opportunities. After all, a CFO does not have to move to another firm as 
long as they receive equivalent promotion opportunities inside their own firms. Therefore, I 
examine the award effect on the internal promotion as the next step. I require CFOs to stay in the 
current firm for at least one year after the award to be included in the test. For robustness, I also 
require CFOs to stay at least two years after the award in some specifications.  
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
Panel B confirms the prediction in H2. All coefficients on Awardees are significant and 
positive, suggesting that winners face substantially more promotion opportunities inside the firm. 
As expected, the likelihood of internal promotion is concave with respect to rank. The coefficient 
is positive and significant on TransRank and negative and significant on 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘2. However, 
this does not reduce the extra effect of winning the award. In column 3, 4, 7, and 8, the coefficients 
on Awardee are all positive and significant at 1% level. 
Then I combine external and internal promotion to construct two new dependent variables: At 
Least One, an indicator equal to 1 if a CFO experiences at least one type of promotion (i.e., external 
or internal) after the award year; and Any Promotion – Multiclass, which equals 1 if either type 
occurs after the award, 2 if both, and 0 if none. Results are shown in Table 3. In Panel A where 
logit regressions are used, coefficients on Awardee are positive and significant in both the narrow 
group and the complete group, suggesting that awardees are more likely to experience at least one 
type of promotion after the award. The probability of promotion, on average, is 35% for the lowest-
ranked awardees, substantially higher than that of the highest-ranked non-awardees (24%). In 
Panel B, I use multinomial logistic regressions.21 The results show that awardees not only have a 
larger chance to have either type of promotion, but also are more likely to have both.  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
3.2 Award Effects on Earnings Management 
3.2.1 Discretionary Accruals and CFO Awards 
Results in 3.1 suggest that awardees are favored candidates in the labor market both inside 
and outside their own firms. A substantial increase in career opportunities makes awardees less 
concerned about losing their current jobs, resulting in extra abilities to withhold critical human 
capital and an increase in their bargaining power over the CEO. If the balance of power between 
the CEO and CFO matters for earnings management, a lower level of discretionary accruals is 
expected to be found in awardee firms. In this section, I examine this prediction.  
Figure 5 visually compares the magnitude of discretionary accruals (|DA|) before and after the 
award. |DA| in Panel A is measured as of the fiscal year-end preceding the award year (t0), while 
Panel B shows the average of |DA| in the two years following the award (t1 and t2). An obvious 
drop in |DA| is captured around the award cutoff.  
                                                          
21 I do not control for year and sector dummy because doing so does not permit convergence. In untabulated 
robustness checks, I find similar results by using OLS with year and sector fixed effects. 
[Insert Figure 5 Here] 
Next, I estimate variants of equation (1) and (2) in Table 4. I control for |DA| at t0 in all 
specifications because the pre-assignment dependent variable might be related to the post-
assignment ones (see, e.g., Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Column 1-3 in Panel A use the narrow sample 
and demonstrate a negative award effect on the magnitude of discretionary accruals. Compared to 
the highest-ranked non-awardees, awardee firms have significantly less |DA| at both t1 and t2. The 
economic significance is also remarkable. Winning the award reduces the two-year average of 
|DA| by 106 basis points, noticeably large in relation to the average level in my sample (0.04). In 
column 4 of Panel A, I expand the sample to include all nominees and control for a quadratic 
function of rank. The award effect is similarly significant.  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
Prior work shows that the equity incentives of CEOs and CFOs are strongly associated with 
earnings management (e.g., Bergstresser and Phillippon, 2006; Jiang et al., 2010; Chava and 
Purnanaham, 2010). Therefore, I repeat the above tests in Panel B by adding CFO and CEO PPS 
as control variables. 22  Doing so further limits my sample to S&P 1500 executives whose 
compensation information is available in Execucomp. However, the award effect is still significant, 
while both CFO and CEO incentives are uninformative here. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
The absolute value of discretionary accruals cannot completely capture the changes in accruals 
management. Therefore, I also investigate the award effect on signed discretionary accruals, 
divided into positive accruals and negative accruals. In Panel A of Table 5, I use a subsample 
where firms hold positive discretionary accruals (DA+) in a given period. Column 1 and 2 show 
                                                          
22 CFO and CEO pay-for-performance are defined as described in Appendix 1.  
that winning the award has a negative effect on DA+ at t1 and t2. Moreover, among firms which 
hold positive discretionary accruals in the two-year period following the award, the lowest-ranked 
awardees have 140 basis points less discretionary accruals than the highest-ranked non-awardees 
do. As shown in column 4, the award effect still holds after controlling for CFO and CEO 
incentives. Column 5 and 6 indicate that including all nominees does not change the significance 
of the coefficients on Awardee, either. However, when it comes to negative accruals, the award 
effect becomes weak. Panel B repeats the above tests by using negative discretionary accruals 
(DA-). Among the six specifications, the award effect is only significant at 10% for firms that hold 
negative accruals in t2. Overall, the results suggest that winning the award has a significant effect 
on smoothing positive accruals, but the effect on negative accruals is much weaker. This finding 
is in line with theoretical models where powerful CEOs are more likely to push earnings upward. 
3.2.2 CEO-Power Subsample Comparison 
If the increase in CFO power over the CEO is the main channel of the reduction in 
discretionary accruals, one would expect a difference between firms with different levels of CEO 
bargaining power. The CFO award might have limited marginal effects on earnings management 
in firms with less powerful CEOs as these CEOs already have weak influence over their CFOs. 
Therefore, I divide the full sample into two subsamples based on CEO power. Following Adams 
et al. (2005), I define a CEO to be powerful if she (1) is the only insider on the board, (2) is the 
founder of the company, or (3) holds both the president and the chairman titles. Inspired by prior 
work on awards and CEO status (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2009), I also set the powerful CEO 
indicator to be 1 if the CEO of a given company wins the “All-America Executive Team” Best 
CEO award no later than the CFO’s nomination. I manually collected the list of CEOs who won 
the award from 2004 to 2018.  
I include sample firms which have powerful CEOs at t0 in the powerful CEO subsample and 
assign the rest to the regular CEO subsample. Figure 6 shows clear discontinuity of post-award 
|DA| around the award cutoff in the powerful CEO group. In contrast, the drop at the cutoff is not 
as obvious in firms with regular CEOs. 
[Insert Figure 6 Here] 
 Table 6 presents regression results. In panel A, the dependent variable is the (t1, t2) average 
of |DA|. Column 1-4 employs a subsample where the powerful CEO indicator equals 1 at t0. 
Coefficients on Awardee are significant at 1% in all of the four specifications. The economic 
significance is also considerably large. The lowest-ranked awardee firms hold 168 basis points less 
|DA| than highest-ranked non-awardees. The difference between awardees and non-awardees is 
106 basis points when including all nominees. On the other hand, none of the coefficients on 
Awardee are significant when the regular CEO sample is used, as shown in column 5-8. The 
magnitude of these coefficients is also small relative to the powerful CEO sample (e.g., 52 basis 
points in the narrow sample, and 14 basis points in the complete sample).  
[Insert and Table 6 Here] 
Next, I conduct the subsample comparison of signed accruals and report the results in Panel 
B. I do not control for CFO/CEO incentives here to avoid a further decrease in the sample size. 
Column 1-4 examine positive accruals and show that the coefficients on Awardee is only 
significant in the powerful CEO subsample, suggesting that the previously documented award 
effect is mainly driven by firms with powerful CEOs. Column 5-8 focus on DA- and do not show 
significance in either subsample. 
3.2.3 Real Earnings Management 
Results so far suggest that the balance of power between CEO and CFO reduces accounting-
based earnings management. However, these results do not necessarily imply a decrease in overall 
earnings management activities, because firms may substitute accruals management for real 
activities manipulation. As a next step, therefore, I investigate the influence of winning the award 
on real earnings management to show a complete picture of the effect of the balance of power.  
Figure 7 plots the three proxies of real earnings management before and after the award. 
RM_CFO and RM_DISX are calculated by multiplying abnormal cash flows from operations and 
abnormal discretionary expenses by -1, respectively, so that higher values indicate larger REM. 
There is no visual evidence in Figure 7 that real earnings management significantly increase after 
the award. Indeed, there is a slight drop in ex post RM_CFO and RM_PROD around the cutoff.  
[Insert Figure 7 Here] 
Table 7 reports results from estimating OLS regressions. Panel A shows that the lowest-ranked 
awardees have less RM_CFO at t2 than the highest-ranked non-awardees, significant at 10%. The 
(t1, t2) average of RM_CFO also appears to be less for the lowest-ranked awardees. After including 
all nominees, the significance disappears, though the sign of the coefficient keeps negative. Panel 
B and C suggest that winning the award has no significant effect on either RM_DISX or RM_PROD.  
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
If the increase in CFO power over the CEO will lead to a switch from AEM to REM, one 
would expect a stronger effect in the powerful CEO group because firms with weak CEOs may 
have already set REM at a high level. In other words, it is possible that firms with less powerful 
CEOs drive the insignificance documented in Table 7. To address this concern, I conduct a 
subsample comparison using the narrow sample in Table 8.23 Column 1-3 use the powerful CEO 
                                                          
23 In untabulated test, I change to the complete sample and the results still hold. 
group, while column 5-6 employ the regular CEO sample. None of the coefficients on Awardee 
are significant, suggesting no noticeable difference between the two subsamples. Overall, I find 
no evidence that awardee firms increase REM after the award.  
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
 
4. Conclusion 
To conclude, my study provides new evidence on how the balance of power between CEOs 
and CFOs affects earnings management. I employ a unique dataset of “All America Executive 
Team” Best CFO awards that influence CFO job-market status and use a sharp regression 
discontinuity design to establish the causal effect. I document that awardees face significantly 
better career opportunities inside and outside the firm, which can arguably improve their 
bargaining power over the CEO. Consistent with the view that the shifts in power between CEOs 
and CFOs reduce earnings management, I find that awardee firms have significantly smaller 
magnitude of discretionary accruals, relative to non-awardee counterparts. I also document a 
significant and negative influence of winning the award on positive discretionary accruals, while 
the influence on negative accruals is weak. Moreover, the award effects are only significant when 
firms have powerful CEOs. I find no evidence that these results are driven by that awardees are 
more aggressively using REM as a substitute of AEM. 
My study contributes to understanding causes of earnings management and aggressive 
financial reporting and has important implications for corporate governance reforms. Researchers 
and regulators have generally expressed the view that restricting CFO equity incentives may 
contribute to financial reporting quality. The SEC, for instance, amended disclosure requirements 
on CFO compensation after SOX. In contrast, my study provides evidence that balancing the 
power between CEOs and CFOs could also help reduce earnings management. Firms may benefit 
from providing more support for the CFO’s independence and balancing the CEO’s power in 
decisions regarding subordinates’ hiring, compensation, and turnover. 
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Figure 1. Number of Awardees and Nominees by Year 
This figure displays the number of recipients of the “All-America Executive Team” Best CFO award (Buy-
side) from 2009 to 2018. Awardees are CFOs who are recognized by Institutional Investors as the winner 
of the Best CFO award. Non-Awardees are CFOs who are nominated but do not win the award during my 
sample period. All Nominees include all CFOs who are nominated as candidates for the award during my 
sample period, including both awardees and non-awardees. 
 
  
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Awardees Non-Awardees All Nominees
Figure 2. Number of CFOs around the Award Cutoff 
This figure shows the number of CFOs whose ranking is around the cutoff for the “All-America Executive 
Team” Best CFO award from 2009 to 2018. Ranks are centered on zero. Rank = -1 represents the highest-
ranked non-awardees, rank = 1 indicates the lowest-ranked awardees, rank = 2 is awardees who are ranked 
one spot higher than rank = 1, and rank = 3 is awardees who are ranked two spots higher than rank = 1. 
Panel A includes all observations in each of the four ranking groups. Panel B excludes previous winners. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
This table summarizes selected variables for three groups of CFOs. In Panel A, the three groups are the lowest-ranked awardees (Rank = 1), the 
highest-ranked non-awardees (Rank = -1), and all nominees whose rank ≥ -10. In Panel B and C, the three groups are rank = 1, rank = -1, and all 
CFOs who are nominated during the sample period. Ranks are centered on 0. Panel A reports descriptive statistics of external and internal promotion 
after the award. External promotion, Internal promotion, At least one, and Any promotion – multiclass are defined as described in section 2 and 
Appendix 1. Panel B presents accounting accruals and proxies of real earnings management from t0 to t2, where t0 is the award year. |DA| is the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated based on the modified Jones model. RM_CFO is abnormal cash flows from operations. RM_DISX 
is the abnormal level of discretionary expenses. RM_PROD is the abnormal production costs. RM_CFO and RM_DISX are multiplied by -1 so that 
larger values indicate greater earnings management. RM_CFO, RM_DISX, and RM_PROD are estimated as described in section 2. Panel C reports 
the summary statistics of selected control variables. All the variables, except for book-to-market, are estimated as of the end of the fiscal year. Book-
to-market is measured as of the beginning of the fiscal year. All the control variables are defined as described in Appendix 1.  
 
Panel A. Internal and External Promotion after the award 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All CFOs Ranked -10 
or Higher 
  
Lowest-Ranked Awardees 
(Rank = 1) 
 
  
Highest-Ranked Non-Awardees 
(Rank = -1) 
 
               
 Mean S.D. Median N  Mean S.D. Median N  Mean S.D. Median N 
               
External promotion 0.08 0.26 0 3,011  0.14 0.35 0 143  0.11 0.31 0 301 
Internal promotion 0.16 0.36 0 3,011  0.25 0.44 0 143  0.16 0.37 0 301 
At Least one 0.22 0.41 0 3,011  0.35 0.48 0 143  0.26 0.44 0 301 
Any promotion - multiclass 0.23 0.45 0 3,011  0.39 0.57 0 143  0.27 0.47 0 301 
Table 1, Continued 
Panel B. Accounting Accruals and Real Earnings Management 
 
  
 All CFOs in the Ranking list 
 
Lowest-Ranked Awardees 
(Rank = 1) 
 Highest-Ranked Non-Awardees 
(Rank = -1) 
 Mean S.D. Median N  Mean S.D. Median N  Mean S.D. Median N 
|DA| at t0 0.04 0.04 0.03 3,456  0.04 0.03 0.02 118  0.04 0.04 0.02 222 
|DA| at t2 0.03 0.04 0.02 3,017  0.02 0.02 0.01 103  0.04 0.03 0.03 207 
|DA| - t1 t2 average 0.04 0.03 0.03 3,009  0.03 0.02 0.02 103  0.04 0.03 0.03 207 
RM_CFO at t0 -0.09 0.14 -0.08 3,733  -0.09 0.14 -0.08 123  -0.10 0.13 -0.07 234 
RM_CFO at t2 -0.09 0.13 -0.08 3,443  -0.10 0.11 -0.08 113  -0.09 0.12 -0.07 221 
RM_CFO - t1 t2 average -0.09 0.12 -0.08 3,436  -0.10 0.10 -0.09 113  -0.09 0.11 -0.08 221 
RM_DISX at t0 -0.02 0.30 0.00 3,271  0.04 0.29 0.03 112  0.00 0.31 0.00 208 
RM_DISX at t2 0.02 0.28 0.01 3,007  0.05 0.27 0.01 103  0.04 0.30 0.03 196 
RM_DISX - t1 t2 average 0.01 0.27 0.01 2,996  0.05 0.27 0.03 103  0.04 0.29 0.02 196 
RM_PROD at t0 -0.04 0.19 -0.04 3,660  -0.04 0.2 -0.04 120  -0.03 0.2 -0.04 229 
RM_PROD at t2 -0.04 0.18 -0.04 3,381  -0.05 0.17 -0.04 111  -0.04 0.19 -0.03 219 
RM_PROD - t1 t2 average -0.04 0.17 -0.04 3,369  -0.05 0.17 -0.04 111  -0.03 0.2 -0.04 218 
Table 1, Continued 
Panel C. Selected Control Variables 
 
  
 All CFOs in the Ranking list 
 
Lowest-Ranked Awardees 
(Rank = 1) 
 Highest-Ranked Non-Awardees 
(Rank = -1) 
 Mean S.D. Median N  Mean S.D. Median N  Mean S.D. Median N 
Total Assets 6.90 13.14 2.77 3,652  11.54 17.31 5.90 122  10.3 19.18 4.11 232 
Market Capitalization 6.66 12.13 3.20 3,650  12.55 17.74 7.48 122  10.02 17.91 4.62 232 
Book-to-Market 0.42 0.34 0.36 3,547  0.40 0.32 0.33 119  0.43 0.33 0.37 227 
ROA 0.03 0.12 0.04 3,650  0.05 0.12 0.07 122  0.04 0.09 0.05 232 
12-Month Stock Return 0.23 0.52 0.17 3,556  0.29 0.47 0.25 119  0.32 0.57 0.24 227 
Cash Holding 0.17 0.2 0.10 3,652  0.15 0.15 0.10 122  0.14 0.15 0.10 232 
3-Year CF Volatility 0.03 0.04 0.01 4,660  0.02 0.03 0.02 142  0.02 0.03 0.01 275 
Leverage 0.27 0.21 0.26 3,642  0.27 0.19 0.27 121  0.26 0.19 0.24 231 
Big 4 0.93 0.25 1 3,629  0.98 0.14 1 143  0.96 0.20 1 276 
CEO is Chair 0.57 0.50 1 3,712  0.66 0.47 1 143  0.64 0.48 1 276 
Board Independence 0.79 0.13 0.83 3,608  0.79 0.14 0.83 122  0.79 0.12 0.83 230 
CFO Tenure 6.09 4.67 5 3,480  6.08 4.03 5 143  6.04 4.94 5 276 
CFO Age 51.02 6.28 51 2,908  50.09 6.19 51 143  50.37 6.41 50 276 
CFO PPS 0.13 0.11 0.10 2,728  0.16 0.11 0.14 97  0.15 0.12 0.13 193 
CEO PPS 0.29 0.23 0.24 2,726  0.35 0.21 0.32 98  0.35 0.24 0.30 194 
Figure 3. Continuity at Award Year in Various Variables 
This figure illustrates various variables for CFOs whose rank ≥ -10 at the award year. Ranks are centered 
on zero, as described in Figure 2. Means and ninety percent confidence intervals are shown in each panel. 
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Figure 3, Continued 
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Figure 4. External and Internal Promotion after the award 
This figure reports the external and internal promotion after the award for awardees whose rank = 1 or 2, 
and non-awardees who are ranked -6 or higher. Ranks are centered on zero, as described in Figure 2. 
External promotion, Internal promotion, At Least One, and Any Promotion- Multiclass are defined as 
described in the main text. Previous winners are excluded from the sample. Panel A employs a subsample 
of CFOs who leave the company at some point after the award. Means and ninety percent confidence 
intervals are shown in each panel. 
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Table 2. External Promotion and Internal Promotion after CFO Awards 
This table reports the results of logit regressions explaining the likelihood that a CFO experiences the 
external and/or internal promotion within the time interval from the first year after the award to 2019. Panel 
A focuses on external promotion and employs a subsample which only includes individuals who leave the 
company within the time interval. The dependent variable in column 1 and 2 is an indicator equal to 1 if 
the CFO becomes the CEO, president, and/or COO of another firm after the award. In column 3 and 4, the 
dependent variable indicates any type of external promotion, defined as described in the main text. Rank (-
1, 1) indicates the use of the narrow sample which only includes rank =1 and rank = -1. Awardee in this 
group indicates the lowest-ranked awardees. All Rank ≥ -10 includes all CFOs who are ranked -10 or higher. 
Awardee in this group indicates all winners. Panel B focuses on the following outcomes inside the CFOs 
own firm: (1) gaining a key position after the award (column 1 – 4), and (2) experiencing any type of 
internal promotion, defined as described in the main text (column 5 – 8). Stay≥1Yr uses a subsample where 
CFOs are retained in the current firm for at least one year after the award. Stay≥2Yrs limits the sample to 
CFOs who are retained for at least two years after the award. TransRank is calculated by adding the absolute 
value of the minimum to each centered rank. 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘2is the squared term. Other variables are defined 
as described in Table 1 and Appendix 1. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent level. 
Values of z-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered at the sector-
year level. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
  
Table 2, Continued 
Panel A. CFO Award and External Promotion  
 
Key Position in Another Firm  Any External Promotion 
 
Rank (-1,1) 
(1)  
All Rank ≥ -10 
(2) 
 Rank (-1,1) 
(3) 
All Rank ≥ -10  
(4) 
Main Variable      
Awardee 4.1215*** 2.5996**  1.5349** 0.6999 
 (3.280) (2.484)  (2.211) (1.166) 
Control Variables      
TransRank  0.2321   0.0977 
  (0.897)   (0.725) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘2  -0.0325   -0.0039 
  (-1.323)   (-0.315) 
Log(Market cap) -0.3123 0.2264  -0.1770 -0.1145 
 (-0.608) (1.407)  (-0.359) (-1.258) 
12-mon stock return -4.8785*** -0.5799  0.5971 0.1418 
 (-3.124) (-1.599)  (0.654) (0.716) 
ROA -1.6235 -0.1056  9.8672** -0.2101 
 (-0.310) (-0.078)  (1.965) (-0.256) 
Book-to-market -1.5175 -0.0141  0.9277 -0.1335 
 (-0.672) (-0.031)  (0.518) (-0.557) 
Tenure -0.2948 -0.0581  -0.4932*** -0.1277*** 
 (-1.107) (-1.477)  (-4.602) (-4.927) 
CEO is chair -2.8613** -0.0387  -2.2425*** 0.0202 
 (-2.418) (-0.110)  (-2.699) (0.107) 
Board Independence 2.2578 1.8677  -8.0775*** -0.1945 
 (0.505) (1.082)  (-3.230) (-0.224) 
      
Year dummy Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Sector dummy Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
      
Pseudo R2 0.49 0.19  0.45 0.13 
Observations 101 567  110 1,067 
      
      
 
Table 2, Continued 
Panel B. CFO Award and Internal Promotion 
 
Key Position in Own Firm  Any Internal Promotion 
 Rank (-1,1)   All Rank ≥ -10   Rank (-1,1)   All Rank ≥ -10 
Stay≥1Yr 
(1) 
Stay≥2Yrs 
(2) 
 Stay≥1Yr 
(3) 
Stay≥2Yrs 
(4) 
Stay≥1Yr 
(5) 
Stay≥2Yrs 
(6) 
 Stay≥1Yr 
(7) 
Stay≥2Yrs 
(8) 
Main Variable 
           
Awardee 1.0505** 1.0839**  1.2742*** 1.3629***  0.9477** 0.9619**  1.3712*** 1.4300*** 
 (2.343) (2.406)  (2.947) (3.014)  (2.338) (2.402)  (3.311) (3.323) 
Control Variables            
TransRank    0.1962** 0.2133**     0.2494*** 0.2698*** 
    (2.234) (2.388)     (2.883) (3.070) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘2    -0.0197** -0.0219**     -0.0231*** -0.0254*** 
    (-2.257) (-2.434)     (-2.753) (-2.947) 
Log(Market cap) -0.0869 -0.1204  0.1019 0.1006  0.0855 0.0401  0.1297** 0.1225* 
 (-0.449) (-0.587)  (1.444) (1.388)  (0.478) (0.220)  (2.059) (1.899) 
12-mon stock return -0.5918 -0.5177  0.0091 -0.0333  -0.7205 -0.6952  -0.0704 -0.1056 
 (-1.203) (-1.090)  (0.064) (-0.231)  (-1.624) (-1.519)  (-0.519) (-0.769) 
ROA -0.9131 -1.1345  -1.3007** -1.4690**  1.5940 1.1170  -1.2711** -1.4950** 
 (-0.320) (-0.415)  (-2.047) (-2.183)  (0.659) (0.483)  (-2.083) (-2.316) 
Book-to-market -0.2517 -0.5042  0.0117 -0.0102  0.1680 0.0228  0.1118 0.1082 
 (-0.348) (-0.722)  (0.060) (-0.050)  (0.245) (0.034)  (0.575) (0.535) 
Tenure -0.0412 -0.0411  -0.0014 0.0025  0.0075 0.0029  -0.0046 -0.0010 
 (-0.993) (-0.936)  (-0.103) (0.172)  (0.193) (0.073)  (-0.350) (-0.073) 
CEO is chair -0.0018 0.0335  -0.0621 -0.0746  -0.4786 -0.5244  -0.2250* -0.2531* 
 (-0.004) (0.078)  (-0.434) (-0.521)  (-1.237) (-1.329)  (-1.698) (-1.908) 
Board Independence -2.6827* -2.9001**  0.2466 0.2041  -1.0904 -1.1559  0.6078 0.6044 
 (-1.834) (-1.965)  (0.399) (0.321)  (-0.827) (-0.867)  (1.033) (0.989) 
Year dummy Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Sector dummy Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.14  0.08 0.08  0.11 0.12  0.09 0.10 
Observations 211 200  2,159 1,925  232 217  2,221 1,980 
Table 3. External-Internal Promotion Combined 
Panel A presents the results of logit regressions explaining the likelihood that a CFO experiences at least 
one type of promotion (internal/external) within the time interval from the first year after the award to 2019. 
The dependent variable is an indicator equals 1 if the CFO experiences at least one of the two types of 
promotion (external or internal) and 0 otherwise. Panel B presents the results of multinomial logit 
regressions where the dependent variable is 0 if no promotion occurs after the award, 1 if either type of 
promotion happens, and 2 if both. Rank (-1, 1) indicates the use of the narrow sample which only includes 
rank =1 and rank = -1. Awardee in this group indicates the lowest-ranked awardees. All Rank ≥ -10 includes 
all CFOs who are ranked -10 or higher. Awardee in this group indicates all winners. TransRank and 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘2 are defined as described in Table 2. Other Controls include log(market cap), 12-month stock 
return, ROA, book-to-market, CFO tenure, CEO duality, and board independence, and are defined as 
described in Appendix 1. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent level. Values of z-
statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered at the sector-year level. ∗, 
∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
Panel A. Any Promotion – Logistic Regression 
 
 Panel B. Any Promotion – Multinomial Logistic Regression
 At Least One 
Rank (-1,1) 
(1) 
All Rank ≥ -10 
(2) 
Main Variable 
  
Awardee 0.8390** 1.0944*** 
 (2.567) (3.027) 
Control Variables   
TransRank/𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘2 No Yes 
Other Controls Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes 
Sector dummy Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.14 
Observations 211 200 
  Any Promotion – Multiclass 
  Rank (-1,1)   All Rank ≥ -10 
Either Type 
(1) 
Both 
(2) 
 Either  Type 
(3) 
Both 
(4) 
Main Variable 
      
Awardee  0.7348*** 2.5818**  0.7041** 2.0930* 
  (2.645) (2.377)  (2.011) (1.872) 
Control Variables       
TransRank/ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘2  No No  Yes Yes 
Other Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummy  No No  No No 
Sector dummy  No No  No No 
Pseudo R2  0.11 0.12  0.09 0.10 
Observations  232 217  2,221 1,980 
Figure 5. Discretionary Accruals before and after the Award 
This figure shows the magnitude of discretionary accruals (|DA|) before and after the award for rank =1 
and rank =2 awardees and the top-six ranked non-awardees. Ranks are centered on zero. Panel A reports 
|DA| at the award year, while Panel B shows the (t1, t2) average. Previous winners are excluded from the 
sample. Means and ninety percent confidence intervals are shown in each panel. 
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Table 4. The Magnitude of Discretionary Accruals and CFO Awards 
This table presents the effects of CFO awards on the magnitude of discretionary accruals. Panel A includes 
all sample firms whose data of discretionary accruals are available. The dependent variable, |DA|, is the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals. T1 and t2 indicates the first and the second year after the award, 
respectively. T1 t2 average is the average of |DA| in the two years following the award. Panel B only 
includes firms whose discretionary accruals and executive compensation data are available. Rank (-1, 1) 
indicates the use of the narrow sample which only includes rank =1 and rank = -1. Awardee in this group 
indicates the lowest-ranked awardees. All includes all CFOs who are nominated as candidates for the award. 
Awardee in this group indicates all winners. |DA| at t0 is the absolute value of discretionary accruals in the 
award year. CFO Incentives and CEO Incentives are the pay-for-performance sensitivity of CFO and CEO, 
respectively, and are computed as described in Appendix 1. TransRank and 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘2 are defined as 
described in Table 2. Other Controls include log(total assets), book-to-market, ROA, 12-month stock return, 
cash holding, leverage, big 4, CEO duality, and CFO age, defined as described in Appendix 1. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent level. Values of t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered at the sector-year level. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A. The Award Effect on |DA| 
 Rank (-1,1)  All 
 
|DA| at t1 
(1)  
|DA| at t2 
(2) 
T1 t2 average 
(3) 
 T1 t2 average 
(4) 
Main Variable      
Awardee -0.0075* -0.0140*** -0.0106***  -0.0071*** 
 (-1.772) (-2.934) (-3.230)  (-2.817) 
Control Variables      
TransRank     -0.0018 
     (-1.096) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘2     0.0000 
     (1.233) 
|DA| at t0 0.2272*** 0.0129 0.1154*  0.1386*** 
 (3.852) (0.167) (1.958)  (5.497) 
Log(Total Assets) -0.0005 -0.0042* -0.0025  -0.0030*** 
 (-0.246) (-1.925) (-1.358)  (-5.211) 
Book-to-market 0.0006 -0.0113 -0.0070  -0.0042* 
 (0.070) (-1.372) (-1.012)  (-1.847) 
ROA -0.0291 -0.0746** -0.0544**  -0.0405*** 
 (-0.981) (-2.325) (-2.233)  (-3.450) 
12-mon stock return -0.0038 -0.0062 -0.0048  0.0010 
 (-0.595) (-0.968) (-1.099)  (0.587) 
Cash Holding 0.0254 0.0125 0.0273  0.0108* 
 (1.144) (0.512) (1.556)  (1.727) 
Leverage -0.0076 0.0020 -0.0003  -0.0012 
 (-0.645) (0.133) (-0.030)  (-0.317) 
3-Year CF Volatility 0.1141 0.0482 0.0805  0.0273 
 (1.441) (0.518) (1.242)  (1.099) 
Sales Growth 0.0019 -0.0015 -0.0019  -0.0009 
 (0.391) (-0.192) (-0.428)  (-0.346) 
Big 4 0.0221*** 0.0133 0.0190**  0.0029 
 (3.259) (1.054) (2.508)  (0.942) 
Table 4, Continued 
CEO is Chair -0.0071 0.0030 -0.0020  -0.0031*** 
 (-1.582) (0.778) (-0.637)  (-2.689) 
Age -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002  -0.0002* 
 (0.173) (-0.445) (-0.444)  (0.167) 
      
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Sector dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
      
Pseudo R2 0.45 0.42 0.54  0.27 
Observations 313 286 286  2,235 
 
Panel B. The Award Effect on |DA|, Controlling for CFO and CEO Incentives 
  
 
Rank (-1,1)  All 
 
T1 t2 average 
(1) 
 T1 t2 average 
(2) 
Main Variable    
Awardee -0.0093**  -0.0078*** 
 (-2.479)  (-2.873) 
Control Variables    
TransRank   -0.0014 
   (-0.879) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘2   0.0000 
   (0.993) 
CFO Incentives 0.0086  0.0004 
 (0.450)  (0.060) 
CEO Incentives 0.0052  0.0025 
 (0.421)  (0.778) 
|DA| at t0 0.0678  0.1334*** 
 (1.084)  (5.263) 
Other Controls Yes  Yes 
Year dummy Yes  Yes 
Sector dummy Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.54  0.26 
Observations 246  2,157 
Table 5. Signed Discretionary Accruals and CFO Awards 
This table presents the effects of CFO awards on signed discretionary accruals. Panel A focuses on positive 
accruals. Column 1 and 2 limit the sample to firms that hold positive accruals at t1 and t2, respectively. 
Column 3 – 6 include firms that hold positive discretionary accruals in the two-year period following the 
award. Panel B reports the results of award effect on negative accruals. Column 1 and 2 limit the sample to 
firms that hold negative accruals at t1 and t2, respectively. Column 3 – 6 include firms that hold negative 
discretionary accruals in the two-year period following the award. Rank (-1, 1), All, TransRank, 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘2, CFO Incentives, and CEO Incentives are defined as described in Table 4. Other controls 
include log(total assets), book-to-market, ROA, 12 month stock return, cash holding, leverage, 3-year cash 
flow volatility, sales growth, big 4,  CEO duality, and age, defined as described in Table 1 and Appendix 
2. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent level. Values of t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered at the sector-year level. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A. Positive Accruals 
 
Rank (-1,1)  All 
 
DA+ at t1 
(1)  
DA+ at t2 
(2) 
T1 t2 Ave. + 
(3) 
T1 t2 Ave. + 
(4) 
 T1 t2 Ave. + 
(5) 
T1 t2 Ave. + 
(6) 
Main Variable        
Awardee -0.0129* -0.0165* -0.0140*** -0.0153**  -0.0061** -0.0060* 
 (-1.958) (-1.673) (-2.733) (-2.251)  (-2.013) (-1.867) 
Control Variables        
TransRank      -0.0039** -0.0035** 
      (-2.466) (-2.147) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘2      0.0000** 0.0000** 
      (2.410) (2.069) 
CFO Incentives No No No Yes  No Yes 
CEO Incentives No No No Yes  No Yes 
DA at t0 Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Sector dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
        
Pseudo R2 0.58 0.59 0.50 0.61  0.23 0.23 
Observations 129 119 120 106  934 906 
         
         
  
Table 5, Continued 
 
Panel B. Negative Accruals 
 
Rank (-1,1)  All 
 
DA- at T1 
(1)  
DA- at t2 
(2) 
T1 T2 Ave.- 
(3) 
T1 T2 Ave.- 
(4) 
 T1 T2 Ave.- 
(5) 
T1 T2 Ave.- 
(6) 
Main Variable        
Awardee 0.0054 0.0122* 0.0047 0.0033  0.0007 0.0044 
 (0.814) (1.918) (0.849) (0.537)  (0.227) (1.406) 
Control Variables        
TransRank      -0.0000 0.0001 
      (-0.008) (0.037) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘2      0.0000 -0.0000 
      (0.023) (-0.053) 
CFO Incentives No No No Yes  No Yes 
CEO Incentives No No No Yes  No Yes 
DA at t0 Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Sector dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
        
Pseudo R2 0.56 0.58 0.64 0.70  0.29 0.29 
Observations 184 167 166 140  1,344 1,251 
         
         
  
Figure 6. CEO Power Subsample Comparison 
This figure compares the magnitude of discretionary accruals (|DA|) between two subsamples: firms with 
powerful CEOs (Panel A and Panel B) and firm with regular CEOs (Panel C and Panel D). Powerful CEOs 
are defined as described in the main text. Awardees whose rank ≤ 2 and the non-awardees whose rank ≥ -6 
are shown. Ranks are centered on zero. Previous winners are excluded from the sample. Means and ninety 
percent confidence intervals are reported in each panel. 
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Table 6. Discretionary Accruals and CFO Awards - CEO Power Subsample Comparison 
This table presents a comparison of the CFO award effect between powerful and regular CEO subsamples. Panel A reports the award effects on the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals. The dependent variable is the average of |DA| in the two-year period following the award. Panel B reports the 
effects of CFO awards on signed accruals. Column 1 – 4 of Panel B include firms that hold positive average accruals in the two-year period following 
the award, while column 5 – 8 focus on negative two-year average accruals. Powerful CEOs /Regular CEOs indicate a subsample of firms whose 
CEOs are powerful/less powerful, defined as described in the main text. Rank (-1, 1), All, TransRank, 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘2, CFO Incentives, and CEO 
Incentives are defined as described in Table 4. Other controls include log(total assets), book-to-market, ROA, 12 month stock return, cash holding, 
leverage, 3-year cash flow volatility, sales growth, big 4,  CEO duality, and age, defined as described in Appendix 2. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1st and 99th percent level. Values of t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered at the sector-year 
level. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A. Magnitude of Discretionary Accruals – Powerful CEOs vs.  Regular CEOs 
 
Powerful CEOs  Regular CEOs 
 
Rank (-1, 1) 
(1)  
Rank (-1, 1) 
(2) 
All 
(3) 
All 
(4) 
 Rank (-1, 1) 
(5)  
Rank (-1, 1) 
(6) 
All 
(7) 
All 
(8) 
Main Variable          
Awardee -0.0168*** -0.0150*** -0.0106*** -0.0107***  -0.0052 -0.0073 -0.0014 -0.0028 
 (-3.240) (-2.775) (-2.977) (-2.960)  (-0.716) (-0.573) (-0.370) (-0.699) 
Control Variables          
TransRank   -0.0043 -0.0041    0.0004 0.0008 
   (-1.558) (-1.468)    (0.309) (0.566) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘2   0.0000* 0.0000    -0.0000 -0.0000 
   (1.668) (1.564)    (-0.237) (-0.505) 
          
CFO Incentives No Yes No Yes  No Yes No Yes 
CEO Incentives No Yes No Yes  No Yes No Yes 
|DA| at t0 Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Pseudo R2 0.67 0.69 0.30 0.30  0.71 0.75 0.31 0.30 
Observations 146 137 963 945  140 109 1,272 1,212 
Table 6, Continued 
 
Panel B. Signed Discretionary Accruals – Powerful CEOs vs.  Regular CEOs 
 
DA+, t1 t2 average   DA-, t1 t2 average 
 
Powerful CEOs  Regular CEOs  Powerful CEOs  Regular CEOs 
 
Rank (-1, 1) 
(1) 
All 
(2) 
 Rank (-1, 1) 
(3) 
All 
(4) 
 Rank (-1, 1) 
(5) 
All 
(6) 
 Rank (-1, 1) 
(7) 
All 
(8) 
Main Variable            
Awardee -0.0198** -0.0066*  -0.0180 -0.0027  0.0131 0.0010  0.0060 -0.0075 
 (-2.113) (-1.883)  (-1.086) (-0.552)  (1.417) (0.162)  (0.394) (-1.168) 
Control Variables            
TransRank  -0.0052***   -0.0018   -0.0011  0.0004 -0.0011 
  (-2.737)   (-0.745)   (-0.656)  (0.309) (-0.711) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘2  0.0000***   0.0000   0.0000  -0.0000 0.0000 
  (2.724)   (0.709)   (0.762)  (-0.237) (0.785) 
            
DA at t0 Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Other Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Sector dummy Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
            
Pseudo R2 0.88 0.30  0.85 0.29  0.87 0.20  0.88 0.31 
Observations 60 419  60 515  86 1,272  80 757 
 
Figure 7. Real Earnings Management before and after the Award 
This figure shows the three proxies of real earnings management before and after the award: RM_CFO 
(Panel A and B), RM_ DISX (Panel C and D), and RM_PROD (Panel E and F). RM_CFO, RM_ DISX, and 
RM_ PROD are defined as described in Appendix 1. RM_CFO and RM_ DISX are calculated as multiplying 
residuals from model (4) and (5) by -1, respectively, so that a decrease in the value indicates less real 
earnings management. Awardees whose rank ≤ 2 and the non-awardees whose rank ≥ -6 are shown. Ranks 
are centered on zero. Previous winners are excluded from the sample. Means and ninety percent confidence 
intervals are shown in each panel. 
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Table 7. Real Earnings Management and CFO Awards 
This table presents the effects of CFO awards on the three proxies of real earnings management: abnormal 
cash flows from operations, abnormal level of discretionary expenses, and the abnormal production costs. 
The dependent variable in Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C is RM_CFO, RM_ DISX, and RM_ PROD, 
respectively. RM_CFO, RM_ DISX, and RM_ PROD are defined as described in the main text. RM_CFO 
and RM_ DISX are calculated as multiplying residuals from model (4) and (5) by -1, respectively. Other 
controls in Panel B and C include log(total assets), book-to-market, leverage, 3-year cash flow volatility, 
CEO duality, and age. Rank (-1, 1), All, TransRank, and Trans𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘2are defined as described in Table 4. 
Other variables are defined as described in Appendix 1. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 
99th percent level. Values of t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors 
clustered at the sector-year level. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A. Abnormal Cash flows from Operations 
 
Rank (-1,1)  All 
 
RM_CFO at t1 
(1)  
RM_CFO at t2 
(1)  
T1 t2 average 
(3) 
 T1 t2 average 
(4) 
Main Variable      
Awardee -0.0138 -0.0213* -0.0176*  -0.0046 
 (-1.348) (-1.751) (-1.841)  (-0.663) 
Control Variables     0.0006 
TransRank     (0.276) 
     -0.0000 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘2     (-0.689) 
     (1.233) 
RM_CFO at t0 -0.5396*** -0.4475*** -0.5023***  -0.5354*** 
 (-5.886) (-5.779) (-7.294)  (-22.488) 
Log(total assets) 0.0050 0.0100 0.0089  0.0065*** 
 (0.843) (1.501) (1.573)  (4.422) 
Book-to-market 0.0002 0.0025 0.0033  0.0283*** 
 (0.012) (0.110) (0.169)  (4.856) 
Leverage 0.0257 0.0918** 0.0624*  0.0295*** 
 (0.631) (2.198) (1.718)  (3.280) 
3-Year CF Volatility -0.3134 0.1276 0.0701  -0.0759 
 (-0.826) (0.405) (0.245)  (-0.974) 
CEO is Chair 0.0279* 0.0115 0.0175  0.0055* 
 (1.947) (0.837) (1.561)  (1.874) 
Age -0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0006  -0.0004 
 (-0.951) (-0.355) (-0.700)  (-1.625) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
      
Sector dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
      
Pseudo R2 0.57 0.55 0.63  0.63 
Observations 334 317 317  2,556 
 
Table 7, Continued 
Panel B. Discretionary Expenditures 
 
Rank (-1,1)  All 
 
RM_ DISX at T1 
(1)  
RM_ DISX at t2 
(1)  
T1 t2 average 
(3) 
 T1 t2 average 
(4) 
Main Variable      
Awardee -0.0124 -0.0099 -0.0112  -0.0156 
 (-0.560) (-0.424) (-0.506)  (-1.126) 
Control Variables      
TransRank     -0.0006 
     (-0.105) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘2     0.0000 
     (0.128) 
RM_DISX at t0 -0.8011*** -0.7492*** -0.7753***  -0.6785*** 
 (-12.450) (-10.891) (-12.332)  (-27.108) 
      
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Sector dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
      
Pseudo R2 0.80 0.75 0.81  0.72 
Observations 301 287 287  2,258 
 
Panel C. Discretionary Production Costs 
 
Rank (-1,1)  All 
 
RM_ PROD at T1 
(1)  
RM_ PROD at t2 
(1)  
T1 t2 average 
(3) 
 T1 t2 average 
(4) 
Main Variable      
Awardee -0.0038 0.0032 -0.0007  -0.0080 
 (-0.336) (0.230) (-0.061)  (-1.087) 
Control Variables     0.0021 
TransRank     (0.827) 
     -0.0000 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘2     (-0.883) 
     (1.233) 
RM_PROD at t0 0.9254*** 0.7874*** 0.8510***  0.7459*** 
 (18.826) (14.089) (17.017)  (32.243) 
      
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Sector dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
      
Pseudo R2 0.84 0.77 0.84  0.73 
Observations 328 310 310  2,516 
  
Table 8. Real Earnings Management and CFO Awards- CEO Power Subsample Comparison 
This table presents the effects of CFO awards on the three proxies of real earnings management in powerful/regular CEO subsamples. The sample 
limits to rank = 1 and rank = -1. The dependent variable is the average of RM_CFO, RM_DISC, and RM_PROD in the two years following the 
award. RM_CFO and RM_ DISX are calculated as multiplying residuals from model (4) and (5) by -1, respectively. Powerful CEO indicates the 
subsample where CEOs are defined as powerful, while Regular CEOs includes firms whose CEOs are not defined as powerful. Other controls 
include log(total assets), book-to-market, leverage, 3-year cash flow volatility, CEO duality, and age and are defined as described in Appendix 1. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percent level. Values of t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors 
clustered at the sector-year level. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Powerful CEOs  Regular CEOs 
 
RM_CFO 
(1)  
RM_DISC 
(2) 
RM_PROD 
(3) 
 RM_CFO 
(4)  
RM_DISC 
(5) 
RM_PROD 
(6) 
Main Variable        
Awardee -0.0112 0.0071 -0.0219  -0.0162 -0.0474 -0.0087 
 (-0.758) (0.176) (-1.449)  (-0.925) (-1.077) (-0.473) 
RM_CFO at t0 -0.4151***    -0.4812***   
 (-3.221)    (-5.089)   
RM_DISX at t0  -0.7586***    -0.7118***  
  (-6.295)    (-6.445)  
RM_PROD at t0   0.8713***    0.8795*** 
   (15.588)    (11.638) 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
Pseudo R2 0.70 0.83 0.88  0.65 0.82 0.89 
Observations 169 151 167  165 148 160 
 
 
Appendix 1. Data Sources and Variable Definitions 
Variable Source Definition 
3-year CF volatility Compustat The standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations deflated by total assets over the current 
year and the past two years. 
12-Month Stock Return CRSP Total compounded return over 12 months prior to 
the month of interest. 
Big 4 Audit analytics An indicator equal to 1 if the firm hires a big-4 
external auditor in a given fiscal year. 
Board independence BoardEx, RiskMetrics Percentage of directors on the board who are 
deemed independent according to the applicable 
NYSE or Nasdaq regulatory definitions. 
Book-to-market Compustat Book to market ratio measured as of the beginning 
of the fiscal year. 
Cash holding Compustat The ratio of cash and short-term investments to the 
book value of total assets. 
CEO is Chair BoardEx, RiskMetrics A dummy variable which is 1 if a senior executive 
is also the chairman on the board and 0 otherwise. 
CFO Tenure Execucomp, BoardEx, 
Bloomberg, Equilar, 
proxies, 10-k, and Google  
The period that a given individual holds the CFO 
position in the given firm, measured in years. 
DA Compustat Discretionary accruals estimated based on the 
modified Jones model (equation (1)). Details of the 
estimation process are described in the text. 
Leverage Compustat (Long term debt + debt in current liability)/ (long 
term debt + debt in current liability + market value 
of equity). 
Log(Market cap) CRSP Logarithm of market capitalization, as measured by 
the stock price times shares outstanding. 
Log(Total Assets) Compustat Logarithm of total assets. 
Num. of Analysts-3yr Audit Analytics The number of analysts who include the company 
in their buy/sell recommendations within the past 
three years. 
Num. of Analysts-5yr Audit Analytics The number of analysts who include the company 
in their buy/sell recommendations within the past 
five years. The 2SLS analysis employ a 2-year 
lagged variable. 
Num. of Segments Compustat The number of business segments in a given fiscal 
year. 
Past awardee  An indicator equal to 1 if the CFO is a past awardee 
who received the award before this event year. 
PPS Execucomp Delta over the sum of delta, salary and bonus. Delta 
is the dollar change in wealth associated with a 1% 
change in the firm’s stock price, calculated based on 
the methodology in Core and Guay (2002) and 
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) 
Restructure Compustat An indicator equal to 1 if the firm has a non-zero 
value for any of the Comustat restructuring items in 
a given fiscal year. The restructuring items include 
RCA, RCD, RCEPS, and RCP. 
RM_CFO Compustat Abnormal cash flows from operations, calculated by 
multiply residuals in model (4) by -1. Details of the 
estimation process are described in the text. 
RM_DISX Compustat Abnormal level of discretionary expenses, 
calculated by multiply residuals in model (5) by -1. 
Details of the estimation process are described in 
the text. 
RM_PROD Compustat Abnormal production costs calculated as residuals 
in model (6). Details of the estimation process are 
described in the text. 
ROA Compustat Return on assets, calculated as net income over total 
assets.  
Sales growth  Compustat One year sales growth. 
 
  
Appendix 2. Balance Check 
Table A1. Covariate Balance within the narrow Sample  
 
 Mean 
 
t-test 
Covariate 
Rank=1 
(1) 
Rank=-1 
 (2) 
% bias 
(3) 
 t 
(4) 
p > |t| 
(5) 
Total Assets  11,537   10,301  6.8  0.6 0.552 
Market Capitalization  12,546   10,016  14.2  1.27 0.206 
Book-to-market 0.40 0.43 -10.6  -0.93 0.351 
ROA 0.05 0.04 9.8  0.91 0.362 
12-month stock return 0.29 0.32 -7  -0.6 0.55 
Leverage 0.27 0.26 5.6  0.5 0.62 
Cash holding 0.13 0.12 2.4  0.22 0.825 
3-year cash flow volatility 0.02 0.02 1.1  0.11 0.915 
Sales growth 0.10 0.15 -16.4  -1.42 0.157 
Big 4 0.98 0.96 11  1.02 0.309 
Board independence 0.79 0.79 -5.5  -0.5 0.619 
CEO is Chair 0.66 0.64 4.8  0.47 0.64 
Age 50.09 50.37 -4.4  -0.42 0.674 
Tenure 6.08 6.04 0.8  0.08 0.938 
|DA| at t0 0.04 0.04 -13.3  -1.13 0.26 
 
